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STATISTICAL ESTIMATION OF THE
PRICE-STRUCTURE RELATIONSHIP
INThODUCTION
TILE GOAL of this chapter is to determine through analysis of the
parameter estimates of the market structure variables if there is
a relationship between the interest price and/or the deposit price
businesses pay banks for the services they purchase and the
structure of bank markets. Before analyzing these statistical find-
ings, however, it is desirable to rationalize the definftion of bank-
ing markets used for the statistical tests and to make clear some
of the problems that are introduced because of the use of a
single-period model.
Delineating the geographic limits of a banking market is com-
plicated by the large number of distinct products produced by
banks. Because this study is concerned only with products pro-
vided to businesses, the roster is substantially narrowed. None-
theless, a large variety must be accounted for. The discussion can
proceed on two levels. A definition can be developed from surveys
of where business firms bank; or it can be determined by a de-
ductive process about business needs for banking services and
knowledge about how banks make decisions on which customers
to seek as clients. The literature contains examples of both of these
procedures.
Studies that relied on survey data were largely motivated by
the requirements of bank merger litigation or regulatory agency
decisions on new charters and branch or merger applications. The
deductive procedure was generally utilized by empirical studies
of bank structure and will be followed in this study. The findings22 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
of the survey literature will be cited, however, to corroborate the
assertions made about the appropriate market definition.
The core services of the bank-customer relationship are the loan
and deposit functions. Except for the payroll and possibly petty
cash requirements of remote plants and offices, businesses hold
their deposits in the banks from which they borrow. Thus, the
lending arrangement is the major decision variable of the business-
bank relationship.
Bank costs in assessing information about a finn's activities
to monitor credit needs, probability of losses, and deposit po-
tential is a crucial variable in determining the expected profita-
bility of the customer. Costs incurred by businesses in developing
and transmitting the required information is a crucial variable for
businesses in determining the choice of bank. The size of these
costs for both the bank and the business is a function of the dis-
tance between the customer and the bank and the reliability of
the financial data regularly developed by the business.
Small businesses do not systematically produce the financial
data required by bank loan officers. Decisions to lend to these
firms require substantial interaction between the banker and the
businessman. Loans to small businesses, therefore, entail sub-
stantial communication costs as the distance between the bank
and the business increases. Since small businesses require a small
number of loan dollars, cost per dollar of loan rises rapidly with
increased distance. Although other bank services to small busi-
nesses may not all have these stringent locational economies, the
central position of the loaning function in choosing a bank con-
nection implies that the relevant market for small businesses is,
in general, highly localized.
This discussion suggests that the geographic size of bank
markets for services rendered to a business is a function of the
size of the business. Small businesses are strongly confined to the
locality in which they are domiciled, medium-sized businesses
can search somewhat more broadly, and large businesses are not
constrained by geography in choosing their bank.' One qualifica-
1Thisdescription of the confines of banking markets, which is probably the
most widely accepted view, was first proposed and utilized by David A. Alhadeff,
Monopoly andCompetitionin Banking, Berkeley, California, 1954.The Price-Structure Relationship 23
tion on bank size is required for this definition. The legal restric-
tion on the size of loan relative to bank capital as well as man-.
agerial prudence implies that large businesses cannot be served
by small banks except as a secondary source.
This description of a bank market certainly describes reality for
large firms. These concerns, no matter where they are domiciled
in the country, are visited regularly by representatives of many
banks and can and do deal with banks at great distances. The
highly localized nature of bank markets for small businesses has
been extensively documented by empirical studies of individual
bank markets.2 The major uncertainty with this deductive de-
scription of bank markets is the ability of so-called medium-sized
firms to bank outside of their immediate locality. The discussion
suggests that, in large part, this depends upon the state of the
finn's financial planning, but little information is available upon
which to make informed judgments. Empirical studies suggest
that bank markets are highly localized until the business reaches
a substantial asset size; but such studies have been conducted for
only a few cities and may not be representative.
Although the description of banking markets given above is
appealing on logical grounds, it is not operational for statistical
testing. There is no way to move from the term "highly localized"
to a general geographic description, such as central business dis-
trict, city, county, standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA),
or state. It has even been argued, with some convincing logic,
that the geographic delineation of bank markets depends upon
the degree of branching restriction.3 Banks with branches tend to
standardize their prices and procedures for handling customer
services throughout their system. Markets dominated by unit
banks tend to be more fragmented since bank policies vary be-
tween individual managements. Ifthisline of reasoning is
accepted, there is no unique or correct general geographic de-
2Forsome examples, see George C. Kaufman,BusinessFirms and Households
View Commercial Banks: A Survey of Appleton, Wisconsin, Chicago, 1967, and
Customers View Bank Markets and Services: A Survey of Elkhart, Indiana,
Chicago, 1967; Lynn A. Styles, Businesses View Banking Services: A Survey of
Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Chicago, 1967.
'Bernard Shull and Paul M. Horvitz, "Branch Banking and the Structure of
Competition," National Banking Review, Washington, D. C., March 1964.24 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
scription of banldng markets. Each market must be studied
separately and its boundaries identified empirically. Such a pro-
cedure is, of course, not feasible for a study that attempts to
develop a general measure of the performance of bank markets;
both because of the large amount of resources required to de-
lineate banldng markets and because custom-made market de-
lineations are subject to endless questions of how changes in the
definition of particular markets would alter the results.
In this study, banking markets are defined to be coterminus
with SMSA's. This definition was chosen because of the avail-
ability of data to represent variations in the demand for bank-
ing services between standard metropolitan statistical areas. In
light of the discussion above, itis clear that this definition
introduces some specification error into the estimates. There is
reason to believe, however, that these errors will not overwhelm
the price-structure relationship, if one exists.
SMSA's are defined to include a geographic area which has
some homogeneity at least in the sense of being a cohesive
market area. This assumes that transportation between various
points within an SMSA can be efficiently accomodated. Although
the empirical studies of local bank markets suggests that, at
least in unit bank areas, the SMSA definition is too broad, there
is little doubt that banks included in this study can, if they
desire, deal with businesses of even the smallest size in any
part of their SMSA. All that is required to defend this market
description for the purpose at hand is that adjacent banks in
an SMSA feel the pressure of competition from one anothers
presence and that their pricing policies are impacted by the
proximity of other banks.
The following section presents the parameter estimates and
statistical tests on models 3 and 4, described in Chapter 2. It
should be remembered that these models are derived from
equation 1. But, equation 2 implied that a profit maximizing
bank would accept or reject customers based on a decision rule
that took account of the expected profitability of the customer
through a planning horizon covering the customers expectedThe Price-Structure Relationship 25
purchases over at least several years. Moreover, because of the
form of the data available from the bank customer profiles, the
characteristics captured in the regressions on models 3 and 4
are a conglomeration of variables that describe elements of
the customer-bank relationship with mixed time periods: the
mean deposit balance covers the twelve months preceeding
the survey; length of relationship covers the full length of time
the customer has dealt with the bank; time in debt covers the
twelve preceeding months; interest rate is the rate after the
last change in the prime rate; loan size is the amount of loans
outstanding at the time the survey was taken (see Appendixes
A and B for the form and description of the data utilized).
Thus, because of misspecffied time elements, specffication errors
are introduced into the regressions that will be presented.
Even if data could be collected to describe the customer
relationship through time, errors would exist because the model
implies that the bank sets its prices to make a profit, given the
customer's expected use of bank resources and the deposit bal-
ances that will be supplied. There are bound to be differences
between expectations and the actual results.
Errors are also introduced by the form of the variables. A
number of questions in the survey requested subjective answers
to questions scaled into two, three, or four partitions. Infor-
mation on these aspects of the customer relationship was thought
to be valuable and there was no way to get at them directly.
The statistical problems enumerated above are worth noting,
but with all of these shortcomings the data from the bank
customer profiles are vastly superior to the data available to
all prior empirical studies of the relationship between bank
market structures and prices for business services. Moreover,
largely because of better data, the models estimated are sub-
stantially more realistic than those utilized in prior studies.
PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND STATISTICAL TESTS OF
MODEL 3
Model 3 was formulated to estimate the impact of market26 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
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structure variables on loan rates to business customers. Table
2 contains three regressions. The first, column 1, utilizes the
profiles of all customers in banks domiciled in SMSA's. The
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Intercept 6.525 6.791 6.706
R2 0.18 0.25 0.18
F l22.97a 93.90k 26.OOa
N 7614 4000 1729
NOTE: Thescalings for variables in all regressions on model S are: interest rates,
in per cent; average deposits, hundreds of dollars; log original amount, LogioX, where
X =hundredsof dollars; log bank size, LogooX, where I =hundredsof dollars;
log total deposits of SMSA, LogioX, where X = thousands of dollars; log business
assets, LogioX where X = hundreds of dollars.
Within each column for each variable, the first number is the regression coefficient;
the second, the mean; the third, the T value; and the fourth, the partial corre'ation
coefficient.
In column 1, the variables are listed in descending order of the size of their net
relationship to the dependent variable, as measured by the partial correlation co-
efficient. The numbers in parentheses in columns 2 and 3 indicate the order of vari-
ables if listed by the partial correlation coefficient.
Significant at the .01 level.
bSignificantat the .05 level.28 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
no collateral to the bank. The third, column 3, is on customers
whose loans are collateralized 100 per cent or more.
Regressions on these three sets of customers will be presented
for most of the tests in this study. The "all customer" regressions
are shown because they include all the available customer pro-
files; the data on partially collateralized customers would other-
wise not be utilized. In addition, this form is more comparable
than the other two to prior research which attempted to
measure the price-structure relationship.
The regression on uncollateralized customers is presented
because of the belief that these customers most nearly fit the
implications of the bank pricing mode! specified in equations
1 and 2. The collateralized customer regressions are presented
because of the belief that these customers are treated in a dis-
tinctly different manner from those with no collateral. Handling
collateral is an additional cost of the banking relationship. But,
the collateral greatly reduces the risk exposure of the bank. More
important, there is a high probability that the uncollateralized
customer has a long-run profitable relationship with the bank;
whereas, the collateralized customer has a high probability of
having an intermittent relationship or of being a new customer.
Thus, regressions on collateralized customers provide insights
into the costs and risks associated with business lending. Differ-
ences in parameter estimates between noncollateralized and
collateralized loan customers provide insights into differences
between long- and short-term relationship customers.
As can be seen, the R2 in all three regressions are relatively
low; but they are all statistically significant at the 1 per cent
level, which indicates a high statistical probability that the
independent variables have an influence on loan rates.
In the regression on all customers, column 1, the variables
are listed in descending order of the size of their net relation-
ship to the dependent variable, as measured by the partial
correlation coefficient. The coefficient of all but one of the
independent variables is statistically significant at the 1 per cent
level and that one is statistically significant at the 5 per centThe Price-Structure Relationship 29
level. The five structural and market characteristic variables
are among the first seven, ordered by highest net relationship
to the dependent variable. All of the coefficients of the customer
characteristic variables, however, have the signs implied in
equation 1.
The log of the original amount of the loan has the highest
net relationship to the interest rate. The original loan out-
standing is a proxy for both the cost of making and adminis-
tering the loan and for default risk. A substantial part of the
administrative and processing costs associated with the lending
function are fixed; therefore, cost per dollar of loan declines
as loan size increases. The probability of default has been found
to be inversely related to the size of business, and the size of
loanispositively associated with business size.4 Thus, for
both variables for which size of loan is a proxy a negative sign
is expected.
The log of loan size is used because of the belief that this
form, more closely than absolute values, approximates the true
relationship between cost and size of loan, and risk and size
of loan. To test this presumption a regression was computed
using absolute loan size values. As expected, both the partial
relationship between the loan size and interest rate and the
R2 for the entire equation was larger when the log form was used.
Population increase, the proxy for demand for banking serv-
ices, has the third highest net relationship to the interest rate
on loans. Since markets with higher loan demand, other things
being equal, are expected to have higher loan prices, the posi-
tive sign conforms to expectations.
The log of total bank deposits in the SMSA, which has the
fourth highest net relationship with the dependent variable, is
included in the model because of the findings of loan rate
surveys that larger bank markets exhibit lower loan prices than
do smaller markets. Again, the log rather than absolute values
'Geoffrey H. Moore, Thomas R. Atkinson, and Edward I. Kilberg, "Risk and
Returns in Small Business Financing," Financing Small Business, Part 1, Federal
Reserve System, Washington, D.C., April 1958, p. 44.30 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
is used after testing for goodness of fit between these two forms.
The positive sign of this variable is contrary to expectations
from loan rate surveys. But this is a net relationship, after tak-
ing account of bank size, demand characteristics, market struc-
ture, size of loan, and customer characteristics. This suggests
that the observed simple relationship between market size and
loan rates confounds the effects of other variables that are not
included. But, it should also be noted that a positive net rela-
tionship between market size and loan rates has a higher prob-
ability of occurrence during periods of relatively tight monetary
conditions, such as have prevailed since mid-1966 to the date
of the customer survey, than during other phases of the cycle.
The relatively low ceiling rates of Regulation Q,duringsuch
periods, impose a heavy cost of funds burden on the larger
banks, which place a relatively heavy reliance on purchased
money. The positive relationship between size of bank and
size of market suggests that the positive sign of the size of
market coefficient might then be caused, in part, by the larger
banks passing on the relative rise in their cost of funds.
Deposits are valuable to the bank; hence, the negative sign
of the deposit balance coefficient is expected.
A bank size variable is included because of the often reported
negative relationship between bank size and loan rates. The
log rather than the absolute size is used because of the belief
that any size effect would not be linear but rather would be
large at small sizes and grow with progressively smaller in-
crements as bank size increases.
In the studies that show a negative relationship between
bank size and loan rate, other crucial variables are not ac-
counted for. Large banks generally deal with a greater pro-
portion of large customers than do smaller banks. Since loan
size is a proxy for risk and cost, this difference could explain
the bank size effect that is usually observed. But, size of loan
is explicitly included in this regression.
The bank size variable could reflect economies of scale. But
recent empirical studies indicate that when $40 million inThe Price-Structure Relationship 31
asset size is reached, relatively few additional economies re-
main as bank size increases.5 Or, another possibility, which will
be explored more fully in the discussion of the regressions on
deposit balances, is that the profit strategy of different sized
banks places a systematically different stress on the loan and
deposit prices of the customer relationship. Whatever the cause,
the coefficient of this variable is statistically significant and has
a negative sign, which conforms to prior results reported on
the simple relationship.
A fluctuating deposit is less desirable than a stable deposit;
hence, the positive sign is expected. The bank's knowledge of
its customers' needs increases and its risk exposure in the rela-
tionship decreases with an increasing length of lending ar-
rangement; thus, the negative sign is expected. Increased time
in debt raises the amount of bank funds committed to the
customer with other revenues and deposits taken into account;
the positive sign is expected. Businesses that deal with multiple
banks are expected to have a competitive edge in bargaining
on rates. The negative sign is also expected because it is good
strategy for businesses that deal with more than one bank to
bargain for the minimum loan rate and produce the required
profitability in the relationship with each bank by maintaining
the necessary deposit balances: Loan rates are highly visible
or easily discovered by other banks whereas size of deposit bal-
ances at other banks are not known. The negative sign on
account activity is a reflection of the fact that banks analyze
activity and levy a charge in terms of deposit balances and,
occasionally, fees for this service. Since the charge includes a
profit element, high activity customers add to profit through
balances and this is reflected in loan rate reductions. Customers
that purchase "other services" are expected to provide addi-
tional profits to the bank; hence, the negative relationship with
loan rates conforms to expectations.
The differences in the regressions on uncollateralized and
'See Fredrick W. Bell and Neil B. Murphy, Returns to Scale in Commercial
Banking, Research Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.32 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
fully collateralized customers contain a number of interesting
insights. First, the variation in the ordering of variables with
respect to net relationship with loan rates is instructive. For
uncollateralized customers, the loan size variable has the highest
net relationship. For collateralized customers, it ranks fourth,
below the demand proxy, one of the branch restriction variables,
and below market size. This difference is expected because loan
sizeisvirtually independent of risk for fully collateralized
customers but risk is an important element in setting the loan
rate for noncollateralized customers. The much higher negative
coefficient on the loan size variable for uncollateralized custo-
mers shows again that risk on fully collateralized customers'
loans does not decline as loan size increases. The switch in
sign of the coefficient of "account activity" between these re-
gressions is explained by the differences in the bank-customer
relationship. Fully collateralized customers are less likely to
be long-term profitable customers than are uncollateralized
customers; hence, the profitability of account activity of the
former are less likely to be offset in other parts of the relation-
ship.
Turning now to the structure variables, the concentration
variable is the proportion of total deposits in the SMSA con-
trolled by the offices of the three largest holders of deposits
in that particular SMSA. The deposit data were collected on
an office basis because of the problem of computing market
concentration ratios in states that allow statewide branching.
In such states, the largest bank in a market may be the branches
of a system with its home office in another SMSA. The signs
of the coefficients of the concentration variables are positive
in all three regressions. This implies that loan rates rise as the
proportion of total deposits in the market held by the three
largest banks increase.
Branch restrictions are partitioned into three classes: markets
in unit bank states, markets in restricted branching states, and
markets in states that permit statewide branching. Thus, there
are three branching restriction variables. In each variable, mar-The Price-Structure Relationship 33
kets which are in the class are coded one; the other markets
are coded zero. Two branching restriction variables are shown
in the regressions. The third, statewide branching, is impounded
in the intercept.
As can be seen, the limited branching dummy variable has
the second highest net relationship to interest rate. More irn-
portant, it is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in
all three regressions and has a negative sign in all three re-
gressions. The unit bank dummy variable has a smaller net
relationship to interest rates. But, itis statistically significant
at the 1 per cent level and has a negative sign in all three
regressions. The coefficient of the limited branching dummy
is larger than the coefficient of the unit banking in all three
corresponding regressions. These results imply interest rates are
lowest in limited branching markets, highest in statewide branch-
ing markets, and that rates in unit banking markets are between
these two.
The popular belief that business size is an important deter-
minant of the loan rate accorded bank customers suggests that
this variable should be explicitly included in the model. Table 3
contains the parameter estimates of model 3 with the log of
business assets included as an independent variable. The log
form is used because it is believed that the incremental impact
on loan price declines as size of business increases. Since almost
40 per cent of the customer profiles did not include business
size data, regressions which include business assets have a
substantially smaller number of observations than those in
Table 2.
All three regressions shown in Table 3 are statistically sig-
nificant; moreover, the R2's are marginally higher than in Table
2 in all three corresponding equations. This suggests that busi-
ness size influences the interest price decision. It is also in-
teresting to note that the mean interest rates are virtually
identical on corresponding regressions in Tables 2 and 3, which
suggests that the availability of financial data in bank files is





All CustomereNo Collateral or More
(2) (8) (1)
Interest rate(mean) 6.407 6.343 6.613
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Intercept 6.813 6.988 6.977
0.19 0.25 0.19
F 77.40 60.63a 15.44a
N 4957 2707 984
NOTE; See the notes to Table 2.
a Significant at the .01 level.
bSignificantat the .05 level.
As can be seen, the inclusion of the log of business assets
affected the three regressions in Table 3 differently. For non-
collateralized customers, asset size has the second highest net
relationship with interest rates but loan size still has a relatively
high relationship, ranked third, and isstatistically significant
at the 1 per cent level. On the other hand, business size is
ranked ninth and is only significant at the 5 per cent level
for collateralized customers while loan size is ranked eleventh
and isalso significant at the 5 per cent level. This finding
conforms to expectations. It is reasonable that business size36 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
should not be important when the loan is fully collateralized.
In the noncollateralized regression the strong relationship be-
tween loan size and interest rate and between business size and
loan rate implies that business size has an influence on loan rates
independent of loan size.
The change in statistical significance of the bank size co-
efficient should also be noted.Itisnot significant in the
noncollateralized customers regressions. This suggests that the
significant relationship in Table 2 and in many other statistical
studies may be largely due to the relationship between bank
size and business size. However, the signs of the coefficients
are still all negative, but all are smaller than in Table 2.
The size and signs of the coefficients of the structural vari-
ables are most interesting. The coefficients of concentration
are positive in all three equations but in the fully collateralized
regression it is only statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
Moreover, the size of the coefficients are somewhat smaller
than Table 2. The branch restriction coefficients are all negative
and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Thus, the
indicated relationship is the same as in Table 2 with approxi-
mately the same size coefficients in corresponding regressions.
To properly evaluate the findings of the estimates presented
above, it is desirable, at this point, to review the empirical
literature on the question of the relationship of bank prices
to the structure of bank markets. The major studies in this
area have invariably used loan rate as the dependent variable.
But the models included only loan size and loan maturity to
depict customer relationship variables. A major controversy in
this literature is over the question of whether the demand for
banking services is properly specified by some demographic
surrogate or whether it is necessary to explicitly include region
to properly depict demand variations between markets. Thus,
Edwards6 used data from the 1955 Federal Reserve Business
Loan Survey to estimate the parameters of the following re-
FranklinR.Edwards, Concentration and Competition in Commercial Banking:
A Statistical Study, Federal Reserve BankofBoston, 1964, p. 64.The Price-Structure Relationship 37
gression: Interest rates on business loans= f(concentration,
percentage change in manufacturing employment, average loan
size, percentage of loans with maturities under one year). He
reported that concentration had a statistically significant posi-
five coefficient. Flechsig7 utilized identical data to estimate the
parameters of: Interest rates on business loans = f(concentra-
lion, average loan size, percentage change in employment,
region). He found the concentration coefficient was not statis-
tically significant.8
Although neither of the two studies discussed above found
the coefficient of a branch restriction variable, when it was
included in the model, to be statistically significant, the regional
concentration of the three types of branching restriction argues
for the inclusion of a regional variable in the model. Table 4
contains the parameter estimates when a six partition regional
variable is included in model 3•9 As can be seen, all three
equations are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
Moreover, the inclusion of the regional variable very sub-
stantially raises the R2's compared to those in Tables 2 and 3.
The evidence from these regressions strongly suggests that
the regional effect on loan rates is very significant and should
be included in the specification of demand variation between
markets. Region 6, which includes the Pacific Coast states to
the Rocky Mountains, has the second highest net relationship
to interest rates. The coefficients of Regions 5 and 4 are also
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level in all three re-
gressions; whereas Region 2 is mixed, with two regressions
Theodore C. Flechsig, Banking Market Structure and Performance in Metro-
politan Areas, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1965.
8TheEdwards and Flechsig studies are cited to note the problem of the re-
gional impact on loan rates and to show the models that have been used. Both
studies also suffer from other problems largely due to the data available to them
from the Federal Reserve Loan Surveys. For a critique of these studies and an
analysis of data deficiencies see Almarin Phillips, "Evidence on Concentration in
Banking Markets and Interest Rates," Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1967,pp.
916—926.
'To maintain as much comparability as possible with prior research, the re-
gional partitions are identical to those used by Flechsig. Fleebsig's map of the
regional partitions, op cit., p. 74, is reproduced as Appendix C.38 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
TABLE 4.Regressions on Model 8, All Customers in SMSA's, With a Six Partition
Regional Variable, Interest Bate Dependent
Collateralized
100 Per Cent
All CustomersNo Collateral or More
(1) (2) (8)










































































































































































































































.411 CustomersNo Collateral or More
(1) (9) (8)
11. Deposit fluctuation













NOTE: See the notes to Table 2.
aSignificantat the .01 level.
Significant at the .05 level.40 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
significant and the third not. The coefficients of Region 3 are
not statistically significant in any of the regressions. Region 1
is embedded in the intercept; thus, its significance cannot be
directly tested. Region 1 contains the tier of states in the north-
eastern part of the United States which traditionally have the
lowest interest rates. Thus, the positive signs of the other five
regions indicate the .ratedifferential between each of
the regions and the Northeast.
All three concentration coefficients have a positive sign and
are statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Moreover,
concentration has a higher net relationship with interest rates
than does either of the two branch restriction variables, in all
three regressions.
The unit banking dummy isstatistically significant at the
1 per cent level in the all customer and noncollateralized custo-
mer regression, but the coefficient of the fully collateralized
regression is not significant even at the 5 per cent level. It is
important to note that the coefficients that are statistically sig-
nificant have a positive sign.
The limited branching coefficient is significant at the 5 per
cent level in the noncollateralized regression and not statisti-
cally significant in the other two regressions. But the coefficient
that is significant has a positive sign.
These findings impiy statewide branching markets have lower
loan rates than either restricted branching markets or unit
banking markets. Moreover, the size of the coefficient suggests
that restricted branching markets have lower rates than unit
banking markets. But the evidence on restricted markets is
substantially weaker than the estimates provided in Tables 2
and 3. There is some reason to argue that there is no difference
in loan price between restricted branching and statewide branch-
ing markets. This is implied by the lack of statistical significance
of the restricted branching coefficient in the all customer and
fully collateralized customer regressions.
The theoretical arguments used to justify the choice of SMSA
definitions as the appropriate delineation of banking marketsThe Price-Structure Relationship 41
implied that the market power of banks and, therefore, their
ability to influence price is functionally related to the size of
business. Moreover, the regressions in Table 3 indicated that
business size influenced rates charged. It is, therefore, desirable
to estimate the influence of market structure on different sized
businesses with the regional variables included in the equation.
Regressions were, therefore, computed on customers for whom
business asset data were available, partitioned into three size
classes; up to one-half million dollars, more than one-half million
to one million, and more than one million to five million. These
regressions, computed separately for all customers, noncollater-
alized customers, and fully collateralized customers are shown
in Appendix D. It should be remembered that there was some
question both about the size of firms that should be included
in the "medium size" category and whether this size business
is affected by market power The parameters of the two largest
classes are, therefore, of particular interest. In the collateralized
100 per cent or more category the regressions for the two larger
business size classes could not be computed because all of the
observations for statewide branching markets were in Region 6;
see Appendix E for distributions of customer by region branch-
ing restriction and business size.
The F tests indicate that all seven regressions shown in Ap-
pendix D are statistically significant at the 1 per cent prob-
ability level. In both sets of three regressions mean loan rates
decline, as expected, with increased business size. Interestingly,
the coefficient of Region 6 is positive, statistically significant and
has the highest net relationship with the dependent variable in
five of the six regressions on all customers and noncollateralized
customers.
Parameter estimates and test statistics of the structural vari-
ables are summarized in Table 5. As can be seen, the coefficients
of all of the regressions in both the unit branching and restricted
branching categories have positive signs. But, only two co-
efficients are significant at the 1 per cent level and one at the
5 per cent level. Of great interest is the fact that all three of42 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
the significant coefficients are in the smallest business size class.
None of the coefficients in either of the two larger business
size classes is statistically significant.
The parameter estimates and test statistics for the concen-
tration variable are shown in the bottom third of Table 5. As
can be seen, in all seven regressions the coefficients of the con-
centration variable are positive and all are statistically sigriifi-
cant, four at the 1 per cent level and three at the 5 per cent
level. Moreover, the regression coefficients in the three size
classes, for the two types of customers, are close in absolute size.
TABLE 5.Parameter Estimates and Test Statistics for Structural Variables,
Customers With Asset Data, Three Size Classes, Interest Rate De-
pendent
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In conclusion, the estimates from the regressions on the three
size classes of business customers imply that loan rates are
positively related to the level of concentration of deposits in
the bank market and that size of firm, at least up to $5 million
in assets, does not influence this relationship. The evidence on
the relationship between loan rates and branching restrictions
suggests that a positive relationship exists for firms up to a
half million dollars in assets. The evidence is strong that for
such smaller sized firnis unit banking markets have higher loan
rates than do restricted branching and statewide banking
markets. The data also suggest that loan rates for small firms
are higher in restricted than in statewide branching markets.
But, the evidence is weaker on this latter relationship. The
TABLE 5—(Concluded)































NOTE: Within each column for each variable, the first number is the regression
coefficient; the second, the mean; the third, the T value; and the fourth, the partial
correlation coefficient. The numbers in parentheses indicate the order of the variables
within their respective regressions.
Souncn: Appendix D.
aSignificantat the .01 level.
b Significant at the .05 level.
°Theseregressions could not be computed because of the sample of customers.44 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
evidence is strong that loan rates to firms with more than one-half
million dollars in assets are not affected by branching restriction.
PABAMETE_R ESTIMATES AN]) STATISTICAL TESTS OF
MODEL 4
The discussion in Chapter 2 argued that businesses compensate
banks through a vector of prices: with interest payments when
loans are outstanding, by maintaining deposit balances through-
out the period of the relationship, and on occasion with cash
fees. Although interest is probably the dominant payment busi-
nesses make to banks, in terms of the total value of payments
received by banks, the deposit component of the price vector
isalso an important part of total compensation. From the
business viewpoint, the cost of maintaining deposit balances
is a major expenditure. This is certainly true even in explicit
costs for large firms and it is true of the sum of explicit and
implicit costs for the smaller firms.If deposit balances are
voluntarily held by small firms they could at least purchase
an expanded set of bank services for these deposits. But even
smaller firms probably hold some deposit balances in excess of
desired balances because of bank requirements. In this section,
the parameter estimates of model 4 are presented and analyzed
to determine if there is a relationship between the deposit com-
ponent of the price vector for bank services and market structure.
Parameter estimates and test statistics for model 4 are shown
in Table 6; the regression on all customers is shown in column
1, noncollateralized customers are shown in column 2, and fully
collateralized customers, in column 3.
All three regressions are statistically significant at the 1 per
cent level. Although the R2's are not large, they are larger than
the R2's for the corresponding regressions in Table 2, with in-
terest rate dependentS
In the all customer regression, the coefficients of eight of the
thirteen variables are statistically significant; seven at the 1 per
cent level and one at the 5 per cent level. The first five variables,The Price-Structure Relationship 45




All CustomersNo Collateral or More
(1) (5) (3)
Average deposit (mean) 408.44 463.89 274.81
























7. Length of lending 68.49 (7)69.12 (8)44.37
arrangement 2.66 2.69 2.60
1.15
0.03 0.04 0.03














































































Intercept —284.44 —506.98 —452.50
R2 0.22 0.31 0.20
F 153.29a 125.70a 31.26
N 7614 4000 1729
NoTE: The scalings for variables in all regressions on model 4 are: mean deposit,
hundreds of dollars; log original amount, LogioX, where Ihundreds of dollars;
log bank sign, Logtol, where I =millionsof dollars; log total deposit of SMSA.
Log10X, where I =tenmillions of dollars; log business assets, Logwl, where I =
hundredsof dollars; interest rate, in per cent.
Within each column for each variable, the first number is the regression coefficient;
the second, the mean; the third, the T value; and the fourth, the partial correlation
coefficient.
In column 1, the variables are listed in descending order of the size of their net
relationship to the dependent variable, as measured by the partial correlation co-
efficient. The numbers in parentheses in columns 2 and 8 indicate the order of vari-
ables if listed by the partial correlation coefficient.
Significant at the .01 level.
b Significant at the .05 level.The Price-Structure Relationship 47
ordered by size of net relationship with the dependent variable,
are all customer characteristics. The relatively strong relation-
ship of the customer characteristics is very different from the
relationship found in the regressions on interest rates. In those
regressions, customer characteristics other than loan size rarely
were among the five variables with the highest net relationship
to loan rates; in terms of net relationship the demand or market
characteristics were almost invariably the highest.
The regression and partial correlation coefficients for non-
collateralized customers are very similar to the all-customer es-
timates; seven variables are statistically significant and the first
seven variables ordered by size of net relationship are customer
characteristics. In all three regressions, all of the coefficients
of the customer characteristic variables have the expected signs.
The coefficient of only one noncustomer characteristic vari-
able, log of bank size, is statistically significant and then only
in two regressions. The positive sign on the coefficient implies
that deposit balances increase with bank size after taking into
account all components of the customer relationship. It should
be remembered that the sign of the coefficient of this variable
was invariably negative in the regressions with interest rate
dependent. The positive sign in these regressions is probably
explained by the fact that larger banks acquire a higher pro-
portion of their funds in the purchased money markets and
thus are subject to a greater degree of risk because of fluctua-
tions in the cost of funds. Larger banks, therefore, value de-
posits more highly than smaller banks.
None of the coefficients of market size or the demand surro-
gate, change in population,isstatistically significant. Most
important, the coefficient of neither of the branch restriction
dummy variables is statistically significant in any of the three
equations. The coefficient of the concentration variable is not
statistically significant in the first two regressions. In the fully
collateralized regression it is just significant at the 5 per cent
level, but it has a negative sign. We cannot explain this latter
result.48 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure




AU CuetomersNo Collateral or More
(1) (2) (8)
Averagedeposit (mean) 472.83 505. 17 851.09
































9. Length of lending 48.81 (9)58.50 (12)25.49
arrangement 2.70 2.72 2.66
1.85 1.52 0.89
0.02 0.08 0.01
10. Otherbank 70.51 (15)83.22 (13)38.12
0.29 0.28 0.29
1.84 0.58 0.36































































Intercept —1453.44 —1772.92 —803.77
fl2 0.28 0.84 0.22
F 9777a 92.50a 18.07a
N 4957 2707 984
Nova: See the notes to Table 6.
aSignificantat the .01 level.
bSignificantat the .05 level.
The regressions on customers for which business asset data
are available, with deposits the dependent variable, produced
the same general results as above (see Table 7). The regres-
sions are all statistically significant and although the R2's are
not large, they are larger than in the corresponding regressions
on interest rates. Of the six variables whose coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1 or 5 per cent level in both the
all customer and no collateral customer regressions, five are
customer characteristics; only log of bank size of the non-
customer characteristic variables is statistically significant and
then only in the all customer regression. None of the coefficients50 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
of change in population, size of market, or either of the struc-
ture variables is statistically significant in any of the regressions.
Of interest for the pricing strategy discussion is the effect, on
the parameter estimates and test statistics, of the inclusion of
business assets explicitly into the model. As can be seen, busi-
ness assets does not replace the loan size variable in terms of
partial correlation coefficients(this happened in two of the
interest rate regressions in Table 3). But its coefficient is statis-
tically significant in theall customer and noncollateralized
customer regressions. The positive sign on the business asset
coefficient with other characteristics of the customer, including
size of loan, taken into account in the model implies that as
businesses increase in size they hold more deposits at their
bank. It should be remembered that this variable had a negative
coefficient in the interest rate regressions (Table 3). To the
extent that deposit balances are an important price, these find-
ings suggest a rationale for the often voiced opinion that larger
businesses are preferred bank customers.
Because of the impact of region on interest rates, it is de-
sirableto compute regressions where regional variables are
included when deposits are the dependent variable. Regressions
on deposit balances, with the six partition regional variable,
were, therefore, computed and are shown in Table 8. The F
tests indicate that all three regressions are statistically signifi-
cant at the 1 per cent level. As can be seen in Table 8, the
inclusion of the regional variable does not alter the dominant
relationships observed in Table 7. In the all customer regres-
sion, nine variables are statistically significant, eight at the
1 per cent level and one at the 5 per cent level, of which seven
variables are customer characteristics. The noncollateralized re-
gression has eleven statistically significant variables, of which
seven are customer characteristics. The fully collateralized re-
gression has five statistically significant variables but only two
of these variables are customer characteristics. Thus, the custo-
mer characteristics are the major determinants of the amount
of deposits held.The Price-Structure Relation$hip 51
None, of the coefficients of the two branch restriction dummy
variables are statistically significant. The coefficient of concen-
tration in the fully collateralized regression is statistically sig-
nificant at the 5 per cent level; but the sign is negative. We
have no explanation for this anomalous result.
To test the influence of business size on the deposit com-
ponent of bank prices, regressions were run on model 4 on three
business size classes. The parameter estimates and test statistics
for these regressions are shown in Appendix F. The parameter
estimates for the structural variables are shown in Table 9.
Because all observations on medium and large sized businesses
that fully collateralized their loans in statewide branching
markets were in Region 6, these regressions could not be com-
puted. The R2's for all seven regressions are significant at the
1 per cent level. The signs of the variables and the ranking by
size of partial R conform very strongly to the results of the
other regressions where deposit is the dependent variable.
As can be seen in Table 9, only two of the twenty-one co-
efficients of the three structure variables are statistically sig-
nificant; one at the 1 per cent level and the other at the 5 per
cent level. It is interesting to note that both statistically sig-
nificant coefficients are in the small business size class of the
all customer regressions and both coefficients have a negative
sign. This suggests that small size business customers in unit
bank markets, which have the highest negative coefficients, hold
smaller deposits than the same size customers hold in restricted
and statewide branching markets and that small size customers
in restricted markets hold less balances than are held by small
business in statewide branching markets. Although this finding
is reasonable in terms of our belief in how markets operate, it
isdisconcerting in that the coefficients in the noncollatera-
lized and the fully collateralized customer regressions are not
statistically significant in either the unit banking or restricted
banking markets. Also, the discussion of bank pricing implied
that noncollateralized customers are the appropriate group to
use in estimating the price-market structure relationship. More-52 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
TABLE 8.Regressions on Model 4, All Customers in SMSA's, With a Six Partition
Regional Variable, Average Deposits Dependent
Col1ateralied
100 Per Cent
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Intercept —252.90 —445.46 —275.81
R2 0.22 0.31 0.21
F 114.03a 95.21a fl349a
N 7614 4000 1729
NoTE: See the notes to Table 6.
a Significant at the .01 level.
b Significant at the .05 level.TABLE 9.Parameter Estimates and Test Statistics for Structural Variables,
Customers With Asset Data, Three Size Classes, Deposits Dependent









































NOTE: Within each column, the first number is the regression coefficient; the
second, the mean; the third, the T value; and the fourth, the partial correlation
coefficient. The numbers in parentheses indicate the order of the variables within
their respective regressions.
SOURCE: Appendix F.
aSignificantat the .01 level.
b Significant at the .05 level.
These regressions could not be computed because of the sample of customers.The Price-Structure Relationship 55
over, the weight of the evidence of the regressions where de-
posits are the dependent variable suggests that deposit balances
are not related to branching restrictions. Thus we conclude
that business size does not influence the deposit component of
the prices businesses pay for bank services.
In conclusion, the evidence from the regressions with mean
deposit balance as the dependent variable implies that market
structure variables do not affect the quantity of deposits held
by business customers. Deposits maintained are primarily a
function of the characteristics of the bank-business relationship.
The data suggest that size of bank has some influence on the
level of deposits, but other characteristics, such as variations in
demand between markets and size of markets, do not have a
statistically measurable influence. Thus, it is concluded that the
deposit component of the vector of bank prices in the bank-
customer relationship is not affected by market structure vari-
ables, but rather seems to be applied uniformly across markets.